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The investigation of the mechanisms and principles of human reasoning is as ancient as the
history of philosophy. It has always been clear that there is something special that allows humans,
to a greater degree than other animals, to think about future states, make plans, have rational
discussions, handle complex social situations, and invent marvelous things such as science. What
this “something” was, however, has remained buried in mystery, and it still partially is. At the same
time, demonstrations of human rationality have always been countered by staggering examples
of bad reasoning, in history, in psychology, and, as many people (not us) will admit, in personal
experience. The camp of psychologists and philosophers has thus been divided among those who
were more impressed by the successes of humans against nature (Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes,
Kant, or closer to us, the neopositivists; in psychology, Johnson-Laird, Holyoak, Newell and
Simon, the Mental Logic camp) and those who were more impressed by their miserable failures
(Bacon, Schoepnhauer, Kierkegaard, the nichilists, or the deconstructivists; in psychology, Tversky,
Kahnemann, Evans, etc.). The latter group has argued that developing a theory of rational/logical
reasoning is doomed because there is no object to study. The former group has tried to explain the
(admittedly limited) rationality of the mind by developing theories of the mental representations
and processes involved in deductive, causal, or probabilistic reasoning (O’Brien, 1995; Braine and
O’Brien, 1998; Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird, 2001; Johnson-Laird, 2010): call this approach the
Not-So-New Paradigm.
Recently, a way to reconcile the angelic and the demoniac aspects of human reasoning has taken
the form of a single theory, the Dual System theory. As its name says, it replaces two alternative
theories with one single theory which postulates two alternative subsystems. One may get the
impression that the Dual System theory amounts to a mere reshuﬄing of the problems it was
supposed to address, however, some of its claims may make it more than a simple trick of cards.
The theory holds that one of the two systems is evolutionarily ancient, implicit, fast, mostly geared
to track statistical regularities, whereas the second system is explicit, slow, effortful, error-prone,
evolutionarily more recent, and perform abstract and logical reasoning. It is the characteristics of
this second system that explain human errors with logical or complex probabilistic problems.Merge
Bayesianism to this theory and you get what Oaksford calls the “New Paradigm,” which, he writes,
is “based on Bayesian probability and dual processes” (Oaksford, 2015). Not only does the New
Paradigm offer a novel theoretical framework to advance our knowledge of human reasoning, but
it also offer “an alternative theoretical framework to those typically assumed in imaging research
on deductive reasoning.”
We cannot feel the same enthusiasm. First, it seems to us that explaining human reasoning
by constraining it within the dual system theory is overly optimistic. Even within the narrow
realm of deductive reasoning, many systems are likely involved. Certainly beyond deduction
a whole constellation of inferential systems exist, and the interaction between them is neither
simple nor predictable along the very rough boundaries provided by the dual system theory.
Infants seem to be able to draw correct probabilistic inferences, both before and after being able
to verbalize their reasoning (Téglás et al., 2007, 2011, 2015), but it is not clear if these abilities
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are implicit or explicit. So, does probabilistic reasoning belong to
System 1 or 2?
There is also strong evidence that rational problem solving
is deeply entrenched in the human mind at its earliest stages.
Infants understand goals and the optimality of actions in a variety
of situations difficult to capture by the postulation of a single,
non-rational, system (Gergely et al., 1995, 2002; Csibra, 2008;
Csibra and Gergely, 2009; Southgate and Csibra, 2009); they
explore unknown situations making very specific hypotheses and
testing them (Gweon and Schulz, 2011; Stahl and Feigenson,
2015); and they know how to interpret simple probabilistic
situations and how event probabilities change in many different
contexts (Téglás et al., 2011, 2015). What system do these abilities
belong to, and, is it useful to even ask this question?With the little
we know about basic reasoning abilities and their development,
it is hard to see how jumping from paradigm to paradigm can
help in developing the necessary knowledge. Finally, as Oaksford
himself recalls, the Dual System theory cuts the pie in the wrong
way. For example, it is an assumption of the theory that errors
in deductive reasoning depend on it being a System-2-kind of
phenomenon. However, we now know that an important part
of deduction is implicit (De Neys and Schaeken, 2007; De Neys,
2012; Reverberi et al., 2012b), and that many easy deductive
inferences are fast, spontaneous, and make no use of working
memory to hold intermediate conclusions (Braine and O’Brien,
1998; Johnson-Laird, 2010), something that would make them a
System-1-like process. Again, does deduction belong to System 1
or System 2?We believe that the best way to address this question
is to refuse to answer in terms of a theory that is too coarse to
provide any substantial answer. In short, we fail to see what is
new in the New Paradigm, insofar as its novelty depends on the
adoption of the Dual System theory.
Second, besides the Dual Theory, the novelty of the New
Paradigm entirely consists of its probabilistic claim, mostly
spelled out in a Bayesian framework. We agree with Oaskford
that Bayesianism has made substantial new progress in the
understanding of human reasoning, although the framework
is so powerful that it is difficult to find its limits (Endress,
2013). However, it is an illusion to think that such progress
is reason to dismiss the very same questions with which the
Not-So-New paradigm struggles. Bayesianism is a theory about
how hypotheses change in the face of experience. There is no
Bayesian Theory to begin with, if one does not specify the
language with which the very same hypotheses whose degree of
confidence should change are framed. This language is going to
involve a logic, because it has to incorporate logical connectives,
quantifiers, modal operators, epistemic operators, and the like—
precisely the kind of objects that the Not-So-New paradigm aims
at studying (Tenenbaum et al., 2006; Stuhlmüller and Goodman,
2014). In short, the New Paradigm holds that most knowledge is
probabilistic, but that probabilstic knowledge must lie on a bed
of logical representations and of logical inference. So if you want
a new paradigm, you’d better develop the Not-so-New paradigm
along.
Given all the above, understanding how the human brain
implements the elementary building blocks of human deductive
competence is a fundamental goal. Neuroimaging can and
has been used to inform/constrain psychological theories of
deduction (see also Henson, 2005; Heit, 2015). However,
Oaksford argues that many studies mistakenly understood
as imaging deduction concern “elaborative, defeasible, and
probabilistic reasoning”, thus suggesting that imaging data
do not support the existence of deduction mechanisms. We
believe these criticisms underestimate the methodological and
experimental progress that the neuropsychology of reasoning,
inspired by the Not-So-New paradigm, has made in these last
15 years.
First, many studies already factor in the methodological
criticisms raised by Oaksford. For example, it has been pointed
out that specific task demands may greatly modify how
participants solve deductive problems, e.g., by using analytic or
heuristic processing (Reverberi et al., 2009a). The importance
of choosing an adequate baseline has also been emphasized
(Monti et al., 2007; Reverberi et al., 2007), or appropriate
behavioral indices (Rotello and Heit, 2014). Also, recent studies
consider between subject variability and try to identify fine-
grained functional specializations within the network involved in
deduction (e.g., Reverberi et al., 2010).
Second, recent convergent findings “deductive tasks” can be
naturally interpreted within the framework of the Not-So-New
paradigm:
1. The left ventro-lateral prefrontal cortex (left VLPFC,
Brodmann Area 47/10) is active when participants are either
evaluating or generating new deductive conclusions, both
when the problems are abstract, and when they contain
thematic information (Monti et al., 2007, 2009; Reverberi
et al., 2010; Prado et al., 2014). Furthermore, activity in the
left VLPFC predicts whether individuals tend to generate
valid answers to deductive problems (Reverberi et al., 2012a),
and is modulated in tasks requiring to evaluate compatibility
of simple propositional sentences with evidence (Baggio et al.,
2015).
2. The posterior portion of the left inferior frontal gyrus (left
IFG, mostly BA44/45) is involved in inference making (Baggio
et al., 2015; see also Goel et al., 2000; Reverberi et al.,
2007, 2010; Prado et al., 2011), and recent studies trace its
contribution to logical forms. Specifically, activity in left IFG
predicts whether or not participants extract and use the formal
structure of deductive problems for generating a conclusion.
Importantly left IFG activation does not predict whether the
generated conclusion will be valid or not, suggesting that
its role is less the active process of drawing a conclusion
than that of representing the logical form (Reverberi et al.,
2012a). Converging evidence suggests that left IFG is devoted
to computing hierarchies and relations among trees (Pallier
et al., 2011). Again, these results account for individual
differences, and suggest the presence of a cascade of mental
representations well predicted by the Not-So-New paradigm.
3. Functional dissociations have been reported between
deductive tasks of different types, such as relative
and propositional reasoning (Prado et al., 2010), or
conditional and categorical reasoning (Reverberi et al.,
2010). Furthermore, some part of the reasoning network
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 588
Bonatti et al. Nothing new
(e.g., VLPFC) have been shown to dissociate “logic” from
“linguistic arguments” (Monti et al., 2009).
These results prompted revisions of too-coarse-grained versions
of theories of deductive reasoning (Monti et al., 2009; Reverberi
et al., 2009b; Prado et al., 2010), but they also confirmed
a neuroimaging approach inspired by main tenets of the
Not-So-New paradigms: content can be separated from form,
logical form from inference; strict predictive relations exist
between patterns of brain activities and individual differences
in participants’ solution strategies. By contrast, we find the
New Paradigm in this context predictively sterile: we fail
to see what novel or different predictions it would bring
about.
Perhaps future progress can be made by changing paradigm.
Certainly, we agree with Oaksford and others (e.g., Heit, 2015)
that the field would benefit from computational modeling,
and further theoretical development. But we believe there is
still much juice to be gained by squeezing the Not-So-New
paradigm. The perspective of progress it offers should not be
overlooked.
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